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This paper covers the credible typical mitigation options available to resolve inadequate pressure 
relief and flare systems. Typical reasons of inadequacy for pressure relief and flare systems are 
presented and common mitigation options for those inadequacies are covered. Then, examples of 
uncommon and unique mitigation options are provided including options such as advanced 




The process safety world is constantly changing and evolving, and rightfully so. When 
considering pressure relief and flare systems, there are several areas where there are ongoing 
developments: 
 
 New calculation methods 
 Regulatory codes and standards 
 Lessons learned 
 
New calculation methods are constantly being developed or enhanced to address both new and 
existing safety subjects and issues. A few examples of this include: 
 
 Two-phase Flow – the Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) has made 
two-phase flow one of its main areas of focus. DIERS spent $1.6 million to investigate 
the two-phase vapor-liquid onset / disengagement dynamics and the hydrodynamics of 
emergency relief systems.  Of particular interest to DIERS was the prediction of two-
phase flow venting and the applicability of various sizing methods for two-phase vapor-
liquid flashing flow. 
 Runaway Reactions – in addition to progressing two-phase flow modeling, DIERS has 
also continued to develop and improve modeling of runaway reaction scenarios. Over the 
years, more sophisticated reaction models have been developed to allow more accurate 
prediction and modeling of runaway reactions. 
 Pressure Relief Valve Stability – new engineering analyses have been developed through 
American Petroleum Industry (API) research groups, to further study pressure relief valve 
stability beyond the 3% irrecoverable inlet line loss criteria. This research has 
demonstrated that pressure relief valves can function stably above 3%, and provides an 
accepted methodology to determine and demonstrate stable operation of a pressure relief 
valve exceeding 3% irrecoverable inlet pressure losses. 
 Acoustic Induced Vibration - Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) is generally applicable 
to lines in gas service, where large amounts of high frequency acoustic energy can be 
generated by a pressure reducing device such as a pressure relief valve. The flow rate and 
pressure primarily govern the amplitude of this energy drop through the piping system. 
Excitation due to this can lead to fatigue failure of welded downstream connections. 
Piping downstream of Pressure reducing devices as below is prone to Acoustic Induced 
Vibration AIV; with failures potentially occurring at small bore branches. It is important 
to consider this phenomenon when designing pressure relief systems piping; as mitigation 
options exist to prevent AIV from occurring.  
 
Regulatory codes and standards are being updated continuously resulting in both new and stricter 
requirements. For example: 
 
API Standard 520 Part I - This standard applies to the sizing and selection of pressure 
relief devices used in refineries, chemical facilities, and related industries for equipment 
that has a maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of 15 psig (103 kPag) or 
greater. The pressure relief devices covered in this standard are intended to protect 
unfired pressure vessels and related equipment against overpressure from operating and 
fire contingencies.  
 
Part 1 of this standard was updated in 2014, and includes basic definitions and 
information about the operational characteristics and applications of various pressure 
relief devices. It also includes sizing procedures and methods based on steady state flow 
of Newtonian fluids.  
 
Pressure relief devices protect a vessel against overpressure only; they do not protect 
against structural failure when the vessel is exposed to extremely high temperatures such 
as during a fire. 
 
API Standard 520 Part II - This standard was updated in 2015, and was also changed 
from a Recommended Practice to a Standard.  It covers methods of installation for 
pressure relief devices in gas, vapor, steam, two-phase, and incompressible fluid service.   
 
API Standard 2000 – This standard covers the normal and emergency vapor venting 
requirements for aboveground liquid petroleum or petroleum products storage tanks and 
aboveground and underground refrigerated storage tanks designed for operation at 
pressures from full vacuum through 103.4 kPa (ga) (15 psig). It was updated in 2014, and 
discusses causes of overpressure and vacuum; determination of venting requirements; 
means of venting; selection and installation of venting devices; and testing and marking 
of relief devices.  
 
This standard applies to tanks containing petroleum and petroleum products, but it can 
also be applied to tanks containing other liquids; however, it is necessary to use sound 
engineering analysis and judgment whenever this standard is applied to other liquids. 
This standard does not apply to external floating-roof tanks. 
 
Other – OSHA’s Refinery National Emphasis Program and PSM Covered Chemical 
Facilities National Emphasis Program included focus on ensuring pressure relief systems 
design documentation was kept up-to-date and accurate and resulted in an increased focus 
on pressure relief systems. 
   
Safety incidents experienced in plant operation lead us to rethink assumptions used in process 
safety, such as which pressure relief scenarios are considered credible. Some examples include: 
 
BP Texas City (2005) – A major incident occurred at the BP refinery in Texas City, Texas in 
March 2005. An explosion occurred when hydrocarbon vapors overflowed from a blowdown 
stack and ignited. The explosion resulted in 15 fatalities and 180 injuries. One of the contributing 
factors in this incident was the use of an inadequately designed Blowdown Drum and Stack as 
part of the pressure relief and venting system for the Raffinate Splitter, which had gone through 
several design and operational changes and was located close to uncontrolled areas. 
 
Sonat Exploration Company (1998) - On March 4, 1998, a catastrophic vessel failure and fire 
occurred at a facility owned by Sonat Exploration Co in Louisiana. Four workers who were near 
the vessel were killed, and the facility sustained significant damage. The vessel lacked a pressure 
relief system and ruptured due to overpressurization during start-up, releasing flammable 
material which ignited. 
 
First Chemical (2002) - On October 13, 2002, a violent explosion occurred in a chemical 
distillation tower at First Chemical Corporation in Pascagoula, Mississippi, sending heavy debris 
over a wide area. Three workers in the control room were injured by shattered glass. One 
nitrotoluene storage tank at the site was punctured by explosion debris, igniting a fire that burned 
for several hours. During the incident investigation conducted by the Chemical Safety Board 
(CSB), it was determined that the capacity of the PSV was inadequate to prevent 
overpressurization and catastrophic failure of the column. 
 
Goodyear (2008) - On June 10, 2008, Goodyear operators closed an isolation valve between the 
heat exchanger shell (ammonia cooling side) and a pressure relief valve to replace a burst rupture 
disk under the pressure relief valve that provided over-pressure protection. Maintenance workers 
replaced the rupture disk on that day; however, the closed isolation valve was not reopened. 
 
On the morning of June 11, an operator closed a block valve isolating the ammonia pressure 
control valve from the heat exchanger. The operator then connected a steam line to the process 
line to clean the piping. The steam flowed through the heat exchanger tubes, heated the liquid 
ammonia in the exchanger shell, and increased the pressure in the shell. The closed isolation and 
block valves prevented the increasing ammonia pressure from safely venting through either the 
ammonia pressure control valve or the rupture disk and pressure relief valve. The pressure in the 
heat exchanger shell continued climbing until it violently ruptured, killing one operator and 
causing extensive damage. 
 
John Bresland, then Chairman of the CSB was quoted as saying "This tragic accident is but the 
latest example of the destruction that can result from a lack of effective pressure relief systems 
and practices". 
 
Williams Olefins (2013) - On June 13, 2013, a catastrophic equipment rupture, explosion, and 
fire occurred at the Williams Olefins Plant in Geismar, Louisiana, which killed two Williams 
employees. The incident occurred during nonroutine operational activities that introduced heat to 
an offline reboiler, creating an overpressure event while the vessel was isolated from its pressure 
relief device. The introduced heat increased the temperature of the liquid propane mixture1 
confined within the reboiler shell, resulting in a dramatic pressure rise within the vessel due to 
liquid thermal expansion. The reboiler shell catastrophically ruptured, causing a boiling liquid 
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) and fire. 
 
These incidents were all investigated by the CSB and are a small snapshot of incidents which had 
some relation to pressure relief systems, as identified in the CSB reports. 
 
Additionally, to meet the demands of the ever-changing safety world, we must seek to 
understand two issues: 
 
 Quality of current safety systems 
 Effectiveness of mitigation options to address inadequate design 
 
Unfortunately, process safety can often be a victim of plant economics - time and money are not 
always available to instantly address every safety issue. Hence prioritization is necessary. A 
sample study of pressure relief systems can be utilized to create a picture of where the plant 
stands on a whole – just like an audit; and enable prioritization of pressure relief systems which 
are deemed to pose a greater risk to the facility. 
 
Pressure Relief Systems Study Background 
 
One process unit within a petrochemical facility which manufactures ethylene and propylene was 
chosen to be included in this study. In all, a total of 124 pressure relief systems and 198 pressure 
relief calculations were analyzed in this study. 
 
Pressure relief systems were judged to be adequate or inadequate based on the following issues: 
 
 Pressure relief requirement compared to relief capacity 
 Irreversible inlet line loss (3%) 
 Backpressure (10% for conventional, manufacturer specific for others) 
 Installation/Code violation issues 
 Temperature concerns 
 
Of the 124 systems and 198 calculations analyzed, 85 systems (68.5%) and 135 calculations 
(68.2%) were found to be inadequate respectively 
 
The pressure relief scenario calculations were found to be inadequate for the following reasons: 
 
 Relief Capacity: 79 cases (40.9%)  
 Irreversible Inlet Line Loss: 62 cases (32.1%) 
 Backpressure: 43 cases (22.3%) 
 
 
Overpressure scenarios which were most commonly found to result in an inadequately sized 
relief system include: 
 
 Blocked Outlet – this was due to the pressure relief consequences not being considered 
during operational changes, such as increased plant throughput and increased operating 
temperatures 
 Abnormal Flow – this was due to the original design neglecting consideration of a 
significant amount of manual valve operation overpressure scenarios, such as inadvertent 
opening of a control valve bypass valve. 
 Thermal Expansion – this was due to the original design not considering thermal 
expansion to be credible, even for heat exchangers with high heat duty. 
 Tube Rupture – this was due to the original design being inconsistent regarding 
consideration of tube rupture as a credible source of overpressure. The original design did 
not consider the mixing effects such as flow of a volatile mixture to the hot side of the 
exchanger. 
 
External Fire and Control Valve Failure were found to result in very few inadequately sized 
systems, even though these two overpressure scenarios were commonly analyzed in the sample 
pressure relief systems. 
 
Several causes were identified that contributed to the number of inadequate pressure relief 
calculations: 
 
 Original design work did not consider specific pressure relief scenarios  
 Missing or conflicting sources of data 
 Changes in plant throughput and operating conditions 
 Changes regarding compliance and company guidelines 
 
Approximately 70% of the pressure relief systems analyzed were found to have an issue of some 
sort.  Most of these issues consisted of interconnecting valves between equipment not being 
locked or car-sealed open which were easily resolved. However, there was also significant 
amount of relief systems that had installation issues which were not as easily mitigated: 
 
 Pressure relief valves set above Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) 
 Low points in the pressure relief valve outlet line 
 
Unprotected equipment was evaluated to determine if there was an applicable overpressure 
scenario in the revalidation study. An equipment item was considered “unprotected” if it did not 
have a free path to a pressure relief device, as defined by both API and ASME requirements. 
There were thirty-two pieces of unprotected equipment identified, of which twenty were found to 
require pressure relief protection as an applicable overpressure scenario was identified for these 
twenty pieces of equipment. The remaining twelve pieces of equipment were found to not have a 
credible overpressure scenario and did not require overpressure protection as the equipment was 
not designed according to ASME Section VIII. 
Equipment which was considered unprotected was broken down into the following: 
 
 Pumps: 15 identified (5 inadequate) 
 Heat Exchangers: 11 identified (11 inadequate) 
 Other: 6 identified (4 inadequate) 
 
Several systematic deficiencies with the previous pressure relief system design work were 
identified: 
 
 Pressure relief valves set above MAWP for system with only fire applicable 
 Pressure relief common inlet and outlet piping not considered for hydraulic calculations 
 Thermal relief valves often assumed to be adequate without proper evaluation of the 
applicable overpressure scenarios 
 Some overpressure scenarios were not considered 
 Manual/Bypass Valve Opening 
 
None of the existing documentation for the pressure relief devices evaluated met the current 
documentation requirements given by API Standard 521, Section 4.7. For example, the existing 







When an existing pressure relief system design is found to have issues, there are many well-




 Installation of larger pressure relief valve 
 Installation of additional pressure relief valve 
 Mitigation of controlling scenario (e.g. fireproof insulation for an external fire scenario) 
 
Excessive Inlet Pressure Losses: 
 
 Reduce the number of fittings, elbows, etc. 
 Use larger inlet piping 
 Increase pressure relief valve blowdown 
 Installation of a pilot relief valve 
 
Excessive Outlet Pressure Losses: 
 
 Reduce the number of fittings, elbows, etc. 
 Use larger outlet piping 
 Installation of a bellows relief valve 
Temperature Concerns: 
 
 Temperatures above Maximum Allowable Working Temperature: Fireproof insulation or 
water sprays for external fire scenario 
 Temperatures below Minimum Design Metal Temperature: Select alternate Material of 
Construction 
 
However, it should be noted that any of these “typical” fixes do not take into account cost – and 
indeed may be cost-prohibitive, especially for existing facilities. Therefore, prior to making any 
physical modification in the facility, it is worth ensuring that every design option has been 
considered thoroughly. Engineering design options will tend to be a fraction of the cost of any 
physical modification in the plant. Several mitigation options exist to address the inadequate 
pressure relief system calculations, including the following: 
 
Administrative changes (ex: locking a bypass valve closed): 
 
The opening of normally closed manual valves contributed significantly to the number of 
inadequate calculations and systems; particularly control valve bypass valves and steam out-
valves. 
Locking closed manual valves that are normally closed results in eliminating 18 inadequate 
pressure relief calculations of the 135 originally identified. Locking these valves closed affects 
more than just the pressure relief area sizing – with the scenario eliminated, there is no longer a 
need for any inlet and outlet pressure loss calculations for that scenarios. 
 
API Standard 521 allows the use of Administrative Controls to mitigate or eliminate 
overpressure scenarios, particularly if the accumulated pressure does not exceed the corrected 
hydrotest. Specific guidance is given in API Standard 521 for the following scenarios: 
 
 Closed outlets on vessels  
 Inadvertent valve opening  
 Check valve leakage or failure 
 Heat transfer equipment failure (tube rupture) 
 
Locating missing data/documentation: 
 
Missing data was not found to be a significant factor in the sample size of pressure relief systems 
regarding pressure relief area sizing, with only one control valve sizing calculation, in the sample 
found to be inadequate for pressure relief area. 
 
However, conflicting data resulted in several inadequate pressure relief systems design as 
conservative assumptions were used in cases where discrepancies existed for: 
 
 MAWP of equipment – Up to date equipment documentation was not available for all 
equipment analyzed, resulting in inefficiencies, and discrepancies between original 
equipment U-1 forms and nameplates and the more recently updated P&IDs and PFDs. 
 Normal/Design heat duty of exchangers – changes in operation resulted in simulation 
normal heat duties greater than the original design heat duty of exchangers, which lead to 
increased pressure relief requirements for scenarios involving heat transfer, such as 
blocking in the cold side of the exchanger. 
 Operating conditions (vapor vs liquid system) - changes in operational procedure resulted 
in flow through several systems condensing to liquid phase from the originally designed 
vapor flow; however, the design of the pressure relief devices and pressure relief piping 
layouts were not updated to accommodate the change to liquid flow. 
 
The amount of information needed to meet the OSHA 1910.119 PSI element can be 
considerable. There is no requirement that all PSI be compiled in a single document, or that it be 
located in a single file. Where it is contained in various documents and/or locations, good 
practice is to compile an index of the PSI and/or locations. 
 
During the National Emphasis Program audits, conducted by OSHA, inadequate or outdated 
Process Safety Information was commonly one of the most frequently cited elements. 
 
In the case of pressure relief systems, this can cause inefficiencies, additional costs, and most 
importantly, the potential for improper relief system design. 
 
Advanced calculation methods – Dynamic Simulation 
 
Improvements in computational power and software have led to increased availability of 
dynamic relief sizing calculations 
 
Various different relief scenarios can be modelled dynamically: 
 
 External Fire 
 Loss of Cooling 
 Tube Rupture 
 Vapor Breakthrough / Liquid Displacement 
 
Benefits of a dynamic pressure relief system simulation include calculating a more accurate 
representation of the system at relief conditions, typically resulting in decreased pressure relief 
flowrate requirements and required relief areas; and hence potentially smaller pressure relief 
valves.  
 
Additionally, dynamic simulations enable the user to calculate the effects of relief on upstream 
and downstream systems, such as the ability to compute changes in flow in and out of the system 
due to changes in pressure and temperature over time. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Example of Dynamic Simulation to Predict Vessel Wall Failure Due to Fire Exposure 
 
Advanced Modeling – Pressure Relief Valve Stability Analysis 
 
Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) stability and the 3% “rule” has been under major focus over the 
past several years as the subject of litigation, research, and modeling. PRV instability is very 
rarely the cause of incidents leading to serious accidents. However, it is important to ensure that 
when the last line of defense is asked to perform, any pressure relief devices operate in a safe and 
stable manner. 
 
The 3% “rule” remains a recommendation and not a requirement in RAGAGEP. The “rule” 
appears in both ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII Division I (BPVC-VIII-I) 
Non-Mandatory Appendix M and as a “should” in API STD 520 Part II. However, based on 
OSHA’s RAGAGEP interpretation, any deviation from a “should” item requires that the measure 
is “at least as protective, or that the published RAGAGEP is not applicable.” 
 
API practice formed the foundation of the ASME guidance. In the past API RP 520 Part II has 
allowed an “Engineering Analysis” to demonstrate that non-recoverable inlet pressure drop 
(IPD) greater than 3% of the set pressure is safe, but has been silent on a method.  
 
Based on significant research and experience, the 6th edition of API 520, now a Standard, 
includes an engineering analysis (§7.3.6) and provides valuable guidance to the reader. 
 
While the previous mitigation options may have primarily addressed pressure relief system 
capacity inadequacies, the irreversible inlet loss inadequacies can still remain a concern. The 
Force Balance method can be used to determine if a pressure relief device installation will 
behave in a stable manner, even when inlet pressure losses exceed 3%. 
 
 Inlet and outlet piping configuration highly impacts stability 
 Irrecoverable inlet loss from friction has little impact 
 
 




Despite all the previous mitigation options, some inadequate relief systems may still require 
actual field changes.  Changes in the field can range from relatively easy and inexpensive to 
troublesome and exceedingly expensive. Some field changes can include: 
 
 Installation of a bellows conversion kit 
 Installation of larger flow area 
 Installation of fire-proof insulation 
 Modification of relief valve inlet and outlet piping 
 
As mentioned earlier, the batch of pressure relief devices evaluated in the sample study were all 
lacking adequate documentation as specified in API Standard 521 (Section 4.7). It is important 




Based on experience with the overall pressure relief system revalidation project, the sample of 
relief systems provided a fairly accurate representation regarding the number of inadequacies and 
types of systematic deficiencies 
 
However, there are several safety issues not identified in the sample study that affect the overall 
plant, such as low temperature, vibration risk, and the effect of missing data. 
As always, there is not a simple solution to all of the safety issues, the experience and expertise 
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